Among ostensibly pro-Novorossiyan analysts, bloggers, and activist-journalists, blaming Putin’s lack of bellicosity for the real crimes of the Kiev Junta has become increasingly popular since the tactical withdrawal from Slaviansk. This is bound to have disastrous results and is itself the product of an intentional disinfo project from NATO’s ‘alternative’ media establishment.
The information or ‘propaganda’ war is a critical element in all conflicts. Conflict is one of the primary motor forces within societies and civilizations, and between them.
We assume that any reader of this article is intimately familiar with most of the pertinent facts and moments of significance which relate to this situation, going back at least to November 2013, and the to a lesser extent the somewhat broader context.
That means this piece is aimed at a limited audience, particularly those involved directly in the work.
It also means that many things will be referred to, taken for granted, and not referenced. Most of the facts can be checked on a search engine when in doubt, and most readers will already be familiar with the data.
In this brief we will attempt to:
1.) Review an error in our prior assessment of the Russian ability to recognize Novorossiya. Two sections and conclusion
2.) Characterize some of the disastrous errors in an emergent propaganda approach which is technically incorrect.
3.) Proscribe the features of technically correct propaganda.
4.) Give ways that frustration can be redirected towards the right target
–
Complete story at - Novorossiya: The Propaganda War – Methods and Framework | Center For Syncretic Studies
The information or ‘propaganda’ war is a critical element in all conflicts. Conflict is one of the primary motor forces within societies and civilizations, and between them.
We assume that any reader of this article is intimately familiar with most of the pertinent facts and moments of significance which relate to this situation, going back at least to November 2013, and the to a lesser extent the somewhat broader context.
That means this piece is aimed at a limited audience, particularly those involved directly in the work.
It also means that many things will be referred to, taken for granted, and not referenced. Most of the facts can be checked on a search engine when in doubt, and most readers will already be familiar with the data.
In this brief we will attempt to:
1.) Review an error in our prior assessment of the Russian ability to recognize Novorossiya. Two sections and conclusion
2.) Characterize some of the disastrous errors in an emergent propaganda approach which is technically incorrect.
3.) Proscribe the features of technically correct propaganda.
4.) Give ways that frustration can be redirected towards the right target
–
Complete story at - Novorossiya: The Propaganda War – Methods and Framework | Center For Syncretic Studies
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